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Abstract 
The relationship between increasing women’s earnings and rising divorce rates 
frequently has been explained by the so-called independence effect: If a wife 
enjoys a higher earning than her husband does, she gains less from marriage. It 
has also been argued that in a society with egalitarian gender attitudes this effect 
is less important. In this paper, we test if the independence effect applies to 
Sweden, a country in which egalitarian gender views dominate and female 
labour-force participation and divorce rates are high. Our analysis is based on a 
large register data set and intensity regression models. We found support for the 
‘independence effect’: The relationship between the share of a wife’s income 
and the divorce risk is positive regardless of the couple’s total income and the 
wife’s education level. 
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Résumé 
La relation entre l’augmentation des salaires des femmes et le taux de divorce a 
souvent été expliqué par le soi disant « effet de revenu » : Si une femme gagne 
un salaire plus élevé que celui de son mari, le mariage lui apporte moins 
d’avantages . Il a aussi été argumenté que cet effet est moins prononcé dans une 
société qui prône des attitudes égalitaires entre les sexes. Dans cet article, nous 
avons testé si l’effet de revenu s’applique à la Suède, un pays où l’égalité des 
sexes prédomine, où le nombre des femmes qui participent à la main d’oeuvre et 
le taux de divorce sont élevés. Notre analyse se base sur un grand registre de 
données et sur des modèles de regression d’intensité. Nous avons trouvé que la 
théorie de « l’effet de revenu » a du mérite. La relation entre la part de salaire de 
la femme et le risque de divorce est positive et cela, indépendément du salaire 
total du couple ou du niveau d’éducation de la femme. 
 
Mots-clés : divorce, égalité des sexes, revenu relatif, la Suède 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Women’s participation in the labour force and divorce rate has been increasing 
in parallel in recent decades. The rise in divorce rates accelerated in the second 
half of the 1960s and in the 1970s throughout the western world. The past 
decades have also witnessed a marked flow of women into the labour market. 
Sociological and economic theories (Parsons, 1949; Becker, 1981) have 
suggested a causal relationship between the changing economic roles of women 
and the rise in divorce, and a large body of literature on this topic has emerged 
over the last couple of decades. More recently, empirical studies based on 
micro-level survey data on both spouses have brought much more insight into 
this topic, however, they have not lead to a clear-cut overall conclusion (for 
recent literature reviews, see Sayer & Bianchi 2000, Rogers 2004). 
The ample literature on the relationship between wives’ labour-force attachment 
and marital stability has been dominated by studies based on data from the 
United States, and framed by the micro-economic and sociological family 
theories, in the context of the mid-20
th century U.S., as the starting point. In this 
article, we also begin with these theoretical arguments; however, empirically, 
the relationship between spouses’ income and marital stability in Sweden is 
examined, a country that differs from the U.S. in many pertinent ways. In 
particular, the differences concern the domination of egalitarian gender views, Does Divorce Risk in Sweden depend on Spouse’s Relative Income? 
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high female labour-force participation rates and the strong ideational and policy 
support to the dual earner family in Sweden where divorce rates are about as 
high as in the U.S. Assuming the trends towards gender equity, and while 
women’s higher labour force attachment and higher divorce rates continue in 
other countries, the Swedish context can be seen as describing these aspects of 
the future in other developed countries. 
Results from earlier studies from developed countries vary in a number of 
aspects, and the way and extent to which the wife’s income is related to the 
divorce risk is not clear. On the one hand, and given the more egalitarian gender 
views today, equal incomes would not have a destabilizing effect on marriage. 
On the other hand, it would be easier for either of the spouses to exit an unhappy 
marriage if one spouse did not depend on the income of the other. In addition, 
one needs to consider the level of the combined income of both spouses. 
Research has found that wives’ contributions to family income lowered the risk 
of divorce by alleviating economic distress (Conger, et al., 1990). Hence, in 
what way and to what extent does the wife’s income, and in particular its ratio to 
the income of the husband, influence the risk of divorce? Educational attainment 
could also mediate the effect of wives’ relative income on divorce because 
education could be a proxy variable for the earning potential. The existing 
studies ignore these elements. In this paper, these questions are addressed by 
applying them to Sweden, one of the countries with the least traditional system 
of gender relations and ideology.  
In our empirical investigation, a particularly large nation-wide individual-level 
data set is used constructed by linking data from different administrative 
registers, which alleviates some concerns typical to survey data, such as sample 
representivity, statistical power, and reliability of self-reported income. 
 
Background and Hypotheses 
 
Wife’s Economic Independence 
The relationship between increasing women’s earnings and rising divorce rates 
has been often explained by the independence effect: when a woman makes an 
income that allows her to be financially self-supporting, she would find it 
relatively easy to exit a marriage should she wish to do so. More generally, if a 
wife earns more money than her husband does, her gains are less from marriage 
than a wife’s whose earnings are lower (Becker, Lands & Michael, 1977). This 
effect rests on the assumption from economic theory that the division of 
breadwinning and domestic work along gender lines is beneficial to the family, 
and the mutual dependence of spouses is a major gain to being married (Becker, 
1981). Sociological theory of the family has also emphasized the specialized Guiping Liu and Andres Vikat 
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division of labour as a functional necessity for the institution of marriage 
(Parsons, 1949). Departure from this model would reduce benefits from 
marriage and increase the likelihood of divorce. A frequently presented 
argument is that a higher income of the wife would destabilize the relationship 
between her and her husband (Ross & Sawhill, 1975; Moore & Waite, 1981; 
Spitze & South, 1985). 
These theoretical approaches are anchored on the sole-earner family model that 
was prevalent in the 1950s and 1960s. This context no longer dominates in 
developed countries, such as the U.S., and is quite distant from the context of 
our empirical investigation, as shown in Section 2.5. Oppenheimer (1997) 
argues that, theoretically, the clear division of household work along gender 
lines is no longer the best rational choice in a contemporary society because of 
the risks that a nuclear family entails if one of its adult members cannot perform 
his or her function. She points out that support for the independence effect 
hypothesis was found only in cross-sectional aggregate-level studies that use 
data from the 1950s and 1960s, i.e. when the different family and labour market 
roles of men and women were still a dominating social norm. In this connection, 
the opposite direction of causality, namely, that women increase labour force 
attachment in response to marital discord, may have an important role. Based on 
analyses of panel data in the U.S., Rogers (1999) suggests this as being the 
dominating causal link between women’s income and divorce risk. 
Oppenheimer (1997) also distinguished the independence effect from the income 
effect. Focusing only on the ratio of a wife’s income to that of her husband, and 
ignoring its interaction with the absolute income level of the family, “tends to 
distract attention from the underlying causes of these ratios and their structure 
determinants” (Oppenheimer, 1997, p. 431). The independence effect hypothesis 
predicts a linear increase in divorce risk by the wife’s income, measured either 
in absolute or relative terms. Sørensen & McLanahan (1987) argue that relative 
income of wives is a valid measure of economic dependency at all income 
levels, including that of families with high incomes. Here, the wife may be able 
to earn money at a level that would allow her to support herself financially. 
Even then, if the husband has higher earnings, she would be dependent on him 
for maintaining her current living standard and possibly her social status. 
Nevertheless, total income of couples could be an important factor to mediate 
the effect of relative income of wives on divorce. In low-income families, higher 
income of wives helps to reduce the family’s economic hardship and does not be 
a disruptive factor for marital stability. In those families, a higher share of 
wives’ income does not mean that wives are economically independent from 
their husbands, either. White & Rogers (2000) conclude that evidence on the 
effect of the success of wives as co-providers on divorce risk is inconsistent, 
whereas problems arise when wives’ earnings are substantially greater than their 
husbands. Does Divorce Risk in Sweden depend on Spouse’s Relative Income? 
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Educational attainment could serve as a measure of earning ability, measure of 
skills of bargaining and solving disputation within marriages. Although 
education correlates positively with earnings, women with higher education 
have been found to have lower divorce risks (e.g., Ono, 1998; South, 2001). 
This negative effect of education on divorce casts has been linked to greater 
(inter)personal skills among the better educated (Ono, 1998). Interestingly, 
Kalmijn, de Graaf & Portman (2004) find a positive effect of wife’s education 
on divorce in the Netherlands. This warrants controlling for the effect of 
education level of both partners and checking its interactions with the income 
measure in our analysis. 
Based on these considerations, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
Hypothesis 1  –  independence effect: divorce risk increases in an 
approximately linear relationship with the wife’s relative income. 
Hypothesis 1a - mediating effect of total income: at low levels of total 
income, the independence effect does not hold. 
 
Equal Dependence of Spouses 
Several recent studies that use individual level data and advanced statistical 
methods have challenged the understanding of a linear relationship between the 
wife’s relative income and divorce risk. Nock (2001) has introduced the concept 
of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS), as unions in which either 
of the spouses generates between 40 to 60% of the couple’s total income. He 
showed that in such marriages, the wife’s commitment to the marriage is lower 
than in other marriages. The husband’s commitment, by contrast, does not 
depend on earnings. The wife’s commitment also decreased with the amount of 
time she spent in paid work. In sum, Nock (2001) argues that MEDS lead to 
higher divorce risks mainly because the wife gains less from the partnership, and 
because the threshold to leave the marriage is relatively low. These arguments 
are in similar vein to those concerning the independence effect. However, in 
addition to the economic independence thesis, he argues that the relationship 
quality suffers because of the wife’s perception that the household tasks are 
unfairly distributed to her disadvantage. This is because men’s attitudes to 
housework have not matched the increase in women’s labour-force participation. 
This is to say, it may be only the wife who perceives the relationship quality to 
be suffering. As Sayer & Bianchi (2000) have shown, the wife’s satisfaction and 
happiness with the relationship is a predictor of its divorce, whereas this does 
not apply to the husband. These arguments lead us to propose: 
Hypothesis 2 – effect of equal dependency: the divorce rates in 
which either of the spouses generates between 40 to 60% of Guiping Liu and Andres Vikat 
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the total income are higher than that of couples where the wife 
earns less than 40% of the income. 
Heckert, Nowak & Snyder (1998) found an inverted U-shape relationship 
between the relative income of wives and divorce risk of the family: traditional 
couples where the wife depended financially on her husband and the “reverse 
traditional couples” that the wife’s income accounted for 75% or more of the 
total incomes, were less likely to divorce.  
Hypothesis 2a –  reverse traditional couples: at the level of 
above 75% of the couple’s earnings, the wife’s relative 
earnings do not increase the divorce risk. 
 
 
Expectations on Gender Relations 
Many analysts argue that gender ideology mediates the effect of women's 
relative income on divorce risks (Greenstein, 1995; Oppenheimer, 1997; 
Sayer & Bianchi, 2000; Brennan et al., 2001). They claim that the independence 
effect hypothesis is based on traditional gender ideology: when men are mainly 
engaged in labour-market activity and women are not, women are economically 
dependent on men. Woman's employment thus does not meet the traditional 
norm and therefore destabilizes the marriage, so the argument goes. However, in 
a modern western society, the labour market roles of both sexes have become 
increasingly similar. This is reflected in a gender ideology that has become 
increasingly egalitarian. In this context, then, equal income of both partners 
stabilizes rather than destabilizes marriage. Ono (1998) and Rogers (2004) 
suggest a U-shape relationship in which the risk of divorce is lowest when wife 
and husband contribute a similar share of total family income. As Sayer  & 
Bianchi (2000) have shown, the wife’s satisfaction and happiness with the 
relationship is a predictor of its divorce, whereas this does not apply to the 
husband. 
An alternative theory explaining the effect of relative income of wives on 
marital instability is the bargaining model (Nash 1950; Lundberg & Pollak 
1996). Wives with higher income have bargaining power with their husbands. 
They have higher expectations of greater equity in marital power and division of 
household work (Risman & Johnson-Sumerford, 1998).  The theory explains 
that wives were more likely to dissolve their marriages if they could not reach a 
point as a result of bargaining with their husbands with lower earning ability.  
Hypothesis 3 – effect of egalitarian gender attitudes: couples 
where each spouse contributes about 40-60% of the total 
income have the economic power structure that conforms to 
the egalitarian gender ideology that prevails in Sweden. This 
leads to lower divorce risks of such couples. Does Divorce Risk in Sweden depend on Spouse’s Relative Income? 
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Income Effect 
The income effect implies when a higher total income of the family improves 
the quality of family life and thereby enhances marital stability. From this 
perspective, higher income of wives should have a stabilizing influence on the 
marriage as it increases the total family income. On the other hand, a husband’s 
poor performance in the labour market increases divorce risk not only through 
the economic difficulties this may cause to the family, but also through the strain 
caused by not fulfilling the wife’s expectations. So far, only a few studies have 
distinguished between the independence and income effect. They found the 
income effect to be weak or non-existent (Greenstein, 1990, 1995).  
Hypothesis 4  – income effect: a higher combined income 
earned from employment improves the couple’s quality of life 
and in this way enhances marriage stability. It follows that 
divorce risks decrease with the couple’s total income rising. 
 
Swedish Context 
Sweden is well known for its high female participation rate in the labour force. 
There has been a political commitment to sustaining equality between men and 
women in family and society (Hirdman, 1998). During the 1960s and 1970s, a 
series of social policies were introduced that aimed at ensuring equal status 
between the sexes. In 1974, a parental leave program was established according 
to which employed women/men with young children received 90% of their 
income if they stayed at home during the first six months of the child’s life (this 
was later extended to 12 months). Full job security for that period was provided. 
The entitlement period was later prolonged to 15 months, of which at least one 
month has to be taken by the other parent (see Sundström & Duvander, 1999). 
The benefit level stood at 80% of the claimant’s average earnings during the 240 
days preceding birth. More than half of the fathers take at least some parental 
leave after the birth of their first child and 11% take three or more months (Oláh, 
2001). These policies stimulated the rate of women’s labour force participation 
in Sweden to reach a very high level: it increased from 53% in 1963 to 86% in 
1990 (Hirdman, 1998), in 1991 the level stood at 78%, and in 2000 at 71% 
(European Commission, 2002). Female earnings, relative to men’s, increased 
too (Henz & Sundström, 2001).  
Sweden is also well known as the forerunner of many of the recent demographic 
trends that Europe has been witnessing, such as an increase in consensual union 
formation and non-marital childbearing. Less than 10% of all unions in Sweden 
start as non-marital unions (Statistics Sweden, 1995) and 55% of all children are 
born out of wedlock (Council of Europe, 2003). About half of all Swedish 
women and nearly as much of all men have a non-marital partnership at age 26 Guiping Liu and Andres Vikat 
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(Bernhardt, 2002). The 'no fault' rule applied in legal proceedings makes divorce 
relatively easy to obtain. The rise of divorce rates throughout Europe accelerated 
in the second half of the 1960s. In Sweden, this increase has continued over 
recent decades. The 1990s level of the total divorce rate is among the highest in 
Europe: it ranges from 0.44 to 0.55 (Council of Europe, 2003). Sweden has one 
of the highest union disruption levels in Europe (Andersson, 2003) considering 
the high prevalence of non-marital unions, which are after all less stable than 
marriages. 
Studies of Swedish divorce trends have highlighted that in the 1980s and 1990s 
divorce risks increased in particular among couples with children. At the same 
time, the number of childless couples and unions with pre-marital children 
increased  – both of these groups have displayed a higher than average risk 
(Andersson, 1995). Andersson (1997) demonstrates that Swedish divorce risks 
vary by parity and the age of the youngest child. Liu (2002) shows that 
stepchildren have a detrimental effect on marital stability. The results of both 
studies were considered when selecting and defining the control variables for the 
regression models in our paper. 
Jalovaara (2001, 2003) analyzes the association between socioeconomic 
positions and divorce risk in Finland, a country adjacent to Sweden that shares 
many of the features in social structure, the Nordic model of the welfare state, 
and cultural aspects with its neighbour. Both the high level of female labour 
force participation and the egalitarian gender ideology particularly enhance the 
comparability of results from these two countries. Furthermore, the system of 
registers in both countries allows analyzing the effect of socioeconomic 
characteristics of both spouses on divorce. The Finnish studies confirmed the 
relationship between the socioeconomic status and divorce as an inverse one. In 
a study on the interactive effects of spouses’ socioeconomic positions, Jalovaara 
(2003) found that couples where the wife had a higher income than her husband 
were somewhat more prone to divorce. 
 
 
Data and Method 
 
Data 
 
We use a set of Swedish register data that contains records of all women born in 
Sweden between 1945 and 1981. Statistics Sweden prepared it by linking 
individual-level information on demographic, social, and economic variables 
from different registers. In our study, women who married between January 
1981 and December  1998 were included, and the divorce risks of these 
marriages were analyzed. Our analysis is limited to marriages between spouses 
born in Sweden to eliminate any influence that the cultural origin or cultural Does Divorce Risk in Sweden depend on Spouse’s Relative Income? 
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heterogeneity of spouses would have on our results. Furthermore, both early 
(before age 20) and late first marriages (after age 35) were excluded to avoid 
distortion of our results by sub-groups whose divorce risk is known to be 
substantially different. In all, 446,145 marriages are included in this analysis, 
77,593 of which ended in divorce during the observation period. The follow-up 
covers 3,892,005 marriage-years. 
 
The social and economic variables pertain either to the status at the end of a 
calendar year or income received during the year. Demographic events  – 
marriage, divorce, and birth of children  – are recorded to the precision of a 
month. The individual records of husbands are linked to the records of their 
wives. This enables us to study the association of the combined socio-economic 
characteristics of both spouses with marital stability. 
 
 
Study Variables 
 
Our dependent variable is the event of divorce measured at a month’s precision. 
The explanatory variables used to test our hypotheses are relative income, total 
income, wife’s level of education, and relative level of education.  
For both income variables, the total income from employment and social 
security benefits (unemployment insurance, parental leave, student allowances) 
are used in this study. The reason is that in Sweden, transfer money is an 
important part of couples’ income. Take parental leave benefit as an example. 
Either spouse on parental leave receives 80% of her or his salary 240 days 
before the new baby is born. She or he can receive this amount of money for 15 
months in total. Since this information is applied to explain divorce risks, we 
specify our models so that income received during year t is used to explain the 
divorce risks during year t+1.  Relative income is defined as the wife's 
contribution in percentage to the total income of both spouses. The variable is 
represented in five categories, using cut-points at every 20th percentile 
(Table 1). Total income is the sum of both spouses' income adjusted for inflation 
and expressed in Swedish crowns (SEK) of the 1998 value. This variable is 
listed in four categories that we obtained by using quartile cut-off points in the 
distribution of married couples by total income. Both of these variables are time-
varying covariates, the values of which are updated at the end of each calendar 
year. Number % Number %
Wife's Share in 0–20% 4,046 6 253,928 7
Couple’s Total Income 20–40% 23,452 35 1,329,407 38
40–60% 32,931 49 1,682,854 48
60–80% 4,779 7 184,292 5
80%+ 2,265 3 67,297 2
Couple's Total Income 0–25.2 22,455 33 985,049 28
(10,000 SEK in 1998 value) 25.2–40.3 28,865 43 1,498,054 43
40.3–55.5 13,026 19 800,890 23
>55.5 3,127 5 233,786 7
Husband’s Education Level pre–gymnasium 14,403 21 617,654 18
gymnasium 35,772 53 2,040,000 58
post–gymnasium 5,057 8 497,415 14
unknown 12,241 18 362,710 10
Wife’s Education Level pre–gymnasium 14,672 22 457,454 13
gymnasium 46,140 68 2,545,498 72
post–gymnasium 5,057 7 436,761 12
unknown 1,604 2 78,066 2
Couple’s Relative husband higher than the wife 10,226 15 505,113 14
Education Level equal 32,772 49 1,986,376 56
wife higher than the husband 11,025 16 598,241 17
either education level 
unknown 
13,450 20 428,051 12
Couple’s Age Difference husband 6 or more years 
older
14,524 22 579,379 16
husband 3–5 years older 16,649 25 890,912 25
husband 1–2 years older 16,098 24 946,025 27
age difference smaller than 1 
year
11,819 18 717,782 20
wife 1–2 years older 5,073 8 253,519 7
wife 3 or more years older 3,310 5 130,163 4
Wife’s Age at Marriage 20–23 21,328 32 766,177 22
24–25 29,525 44 1,638,627 47
29–35 16,620 25 1,112,975 32
Number of  Wife's  0 57,942 86 3,289,566 94
Children from Previous 1 7,177 11 180,797 5
Partnerships2 + 2 ,354 3 47,415 1
Number of  Husband's  0 57,153 85 3,206,953 91
Children from Previous 1 6,103 9 189,794 5
Partnerships2 + 4 ,217 6 121,032 3
Age of Youngest no  child 15,575 23 460,102 13
Shared Child woman pregnant 319 0 276,114 8
under 1 year 885 1 503,797 14
1–2 years 11,776 17 822,153 23
3–5 years 21,846 32 733,619 21
6–8 years 10,284 15 404,091 11
9 years or older 6,787 10 317,903 9
Husband’s first 61,550 91 3,317,934 94
Order of Marriage second or higher 5,923 9 199,846 6
Divorces
Couple-months observed in 
marriages
Number of Divorces and Couple-Months Observed in Marriages 
Table 1
Variable name Category
by the Study Variables for Sweden:  1981-1998
Does Divorce Risk in Sweden depend on Spouses' Relative Income?
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Age difference is calculated using the spouses’ exact dates of birth. Education 
attainment refers to the highest level of education obtained. It is defined as a 
time-varying covariate that is updated each  time  the person completes a higher 
level of education than he/she previously had. In this study, the education level 
is categorized as (a) pre-gymnasium, including pre-school education and nine 
years of compulsory basic education; (b) gymnasium, including upper secondary 
school (usually three years) and adult education; (c) post-gymnasium, including 
college and university. The relative level of education reflects the ratio of the 
spouses’ education level according to these three categories. Hoem (1997a) has 
shown the emergence and increase of a negative correlation between a wife’s 
education level and divorce risk in Sweden in the 1980s; a negative correlation 
has also been found in the United States (Lillard & Waite, 1993).  
In addition, we use in our models a number of control variables that are known 
to influence divorce risk. Wife’s age at marriage is one of them: it is found to 
have a powerful impact on marital breakdown, even more so than socio-
economic status variables such as social class (Murphy, 1985).  
Many studies, including those using Swedish data (Andersson, 1995, 1997; 
Hoem, 1997b), have shown that divorce risk varies by shared children, childless 
couples usually having a higher divorce risk than couples with children, and 
couples with small children or when the wife is pregnant having the lowest 
divorce risk. For our analysis,  the variable age of youngest shared child is 
defined as a time-varying covariate that has the following categories: no shared 
children, wife currently pregnant, youngest child younger than one year, age of 
youngest child from one to two, three to five, six to eight, and nine or more 
years. 
It has been shown by Becker, Lands and Michael (1977) and Cherlin (1978) for 
the United States and by Hoem (1997a) and Liu (2002) for Sweden that, in 
addition to the variation of the divorce risk by the couple’s shared children, the 
presence of premarital children increases the risk of divorce. Based on these 
results, separate control variables are included for the number of the wife’s 
children from previous unions and husband’s children from previous unions. 
These variables include all children before the current marriage whose other 
parent is not the current husband or wife. Marriages of second and of higher 
order are more prone to dissolve than first marriages, which have also been 
attributed to the notion that relationships in stepfamilies generally are less 
harmonious and gratifying (see Furstenberg, 1990). This is because family 
norms are usually ambiguous and bonds between stepparents and their children 
are weaker and sometimes fraught with conflict. Erlangsen and Andersson 
(2001) have recently shown that divorce risks in Sweden also rise with the order 
of marriage. The order of the current marriage is included to control for this. Guiping Liu and Andres Vikat 
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Statistical Procedure 
Estimated hazard regression models of the divorce risks are defined as: 
 
l n () () () μ  ij i j l i l
l j
ty t x w t =+ +  
 
where t denotes marriage duration,  ) (t i μ represents the intensity of divorce at 
duration t for individual i,  ) (t y is the logarithm of the baseline intensity,  ij x  
stands for fixed covariates,  j   for coefficients for fixed covariates,  ij w  for 
time-varying covariates, and i   for coefficients of time-varying covariates. 
The baseline time parameter of the divorce risk is the duration of marriage, 
which is specified as a linear spline with nodes at 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 11 years, until 
observations are censored at 15 years of marriage. Observations are also 
censored at the emigration or death of either spouse and at the end of the year 
1998, whichever occurs first. The regression coefficients of spline functions – 
spline gradients  – express the change in the logarithm of the divorce risk 
between two consecutive nodes per unit of measurement. 
Due to the large size of the data set, statistical significance is not used as a 
criterion for model building or for the assessment of the results: even very small 
coefficients render statistical significance. Our selection of control variables into 
the models is inspired by results of earlier studies. The rare occasions where a 
coefficient is not significant according to the likelihood ratio test at the five-
percent level are marked in the tables. 
 
Results are reported from the models listed below: 
Model 1 =  control variables + total income + relative income 
Model 1a = Model 1 + total income * relative income 
Model 2 = Model 1 + husband’s education level + wife’s education 
level 
Model 2a =  Model 2 + total income * wife’s education level 
Model 3 = Model 2 + relative level of education 
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aML software was used to fit the models (Lillard & Panis, 2000).  Model 1 tests 
the independence effect and the income effect simultaneously. Both spouses’ 
levels of education are added in Model  2 and spouses’ relative education in 
Model 3. The interactions of the wife’s relative income with total income in 
Model 1a, and the interactions of the wife’s relative income with the wife’s 
education level in Model 2a were also investigated. 
 
Results 
 
Control Variables 
The relative divorce risks by the control variables change very little from one 
model to another, and those obtained from Model 1 reflect well their effects 
(Table 2). These effects are consistent with the results from earlier studies that 
have motivated us to control for them. Divorce risks decreased with the wife’s 
age at marriage linearly at about 11% per year.   
The more children the wife or the husband had from a previous relationship, the 
more likely the marriage was to dissolve. Apparently, the children from wife's 
pre-union have a larger disruptive effect than those children from the husband’s 
pre-union. Having a shared child is a sign of commitment to the relationship 
(Thomson et al., 2002), and this is clearly reflected in the lower divorce risk of 
couples with children as compared to childless couples. The risk of divorce was 
considerably higher if the wife had been married before, whereas such 
experience of the husband did not influence the divorce risk notably. 
A large age difference between the spouses increased their divorce risk. When 
the husband was one or two years older than the wife  – which is the most 
common age configuration  – the couple faced the lowest divorce risk. It 
increased the more a couple deviated from this. The increase in the divorce risk 
was notably larger if the husband was younger than the wife as compared to the 
opposite situation. 
 
Spouses’ Income and Education 
We first examine the main effects of the explanatory variables estimated in 
Model  1, which includes the demographic control variables and the income 
variables (Table 3). There was a clear linear pattern in the effect of a wife's 
relative income: the higher the wife's share in the couple’s income, the higher 
the divorce risk. When the wife contributed 80% or more to the total income, the 
divorce risk was twice as high as when she contributed less than 20%; other 
categories by relative income faced a divorce risk between those two extremes. 
These estimates are controlled for the couple’s total income.      The effect of the Variable Category
Relative    
Risk
Spline 
Gradient
0-1 2.9981
1-2 0.6164
2-3 0.1899
3-5 -0.0285
5-7 -0.0721
7-11 -0.0728
11+ -0.0611
Wife’s Age at Marriage -0.1128
Order of Marriage, Wife 1
st 1.00
2
nd+ 1.43
1
st 1.00
2
nd+ 1.02
0 1.00
1 1.98
2+ 2.31
Number of Husband’s Children     0 1.00
from Previous Partnerships 1 1.60
2+ 1.59
0 1.58
1 1.29
2 1.00
3 0.98
4+ 1.21
Age of Youngest Shared Child,     wife pregnant 0.28
Exact Years 0-1 0.17
1-3 0.43
3-6 1.00
6-9 1.03
9+ 1.06
Intercept -4.3522
exp(Intercept) 0.0129
Notes: Relative risks not significantly different from the reference category at five percent level 
are in italics.  All other estimates are significant at the five percent level.  Estimated from a 
hazard regression model that includes all these variables, the two income variables,  and 
spouse’s age difference (Model 1).
Table 2
Relative Divorce Risk by Control Variables for Sweden:  1981-1998
Number of Shared Children
Marriage Duration, Exact Years
Order of Marriage, Husband
Number of Wife's Children         
from Previous Partnerships
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 couple’s total income on divorce risk primarily concerned the lower part of the 
income distribution. Couples in the lowest quartile had the highest divorce risk. 
In the middle part of the distribution, there was no change, whereas those in the 
highest quartile had a slightly higher risk. 
In Model 2, both the wife’s and the husband’s level of education were added, 
both of which showed a strong influence on divorce risk (Table 3). A higher 
education level of either spouse clearly decreased the divorce risk. A wife’s 
education has a somewhat larger influence, as couples with a wife who had 
attained higher education were half as likely to divorce as couples where the 
wife had a low education level. These estimates are controlled for the income 
variables, but they change very little only when these variables are removed 
from the model (results not shown). This relationship also holds when relative 
education level was added to the model. If the wife’s education was higher than 
that of the husband, the couple had a lower divorce risk than other couples. 
There was no difference between couples of the same education level and 
couples where the husband’s education was higher than that of the wife’s. The 
effect of relative education on divorce risk is by far smaller than that of relative 
income. 
The inclusion of education level in the model did not have any influence on the 
effect of relative income, but considerably altered that of the couple’s total 
income. After controlling for education level, a U shape relationship appeared 
with the highest income bracket having the highest divorce risk, and couples 
between the 25
th and 50
th percentile the lowest.  
The interactions between wife’s share of total couple income and total couple 
income (Figure 1) show that in all three percentiles of couple’s income, the 
higher the wife’s share of income, the higher the hazard of divorce, though the 
rate of change of divorce hazard in the lowest 5% income percentile looks flat. 
The interactions between the wife’s share of total income and the wife’s 
education level indicates that in all three categories of wives’ education levels -- 
low, medium and high, the hazard of divorce increases with her share of the 
couple income (Figure 2).  To save space in this paper, results are not presented 
in the tables.  
 
Discussion 
Swedish register data used in this analysis has several advantages.  Since the 
data set covers the entire population, there is no need to be concerned with 
sampling issues and statistical power to support the observed substantive 
differences. There is also no need to deal with reporting errors that may be 
encountered in self-reported income data. With the exception of two recent 
studies from Finland  (Jalovaara, 2001, 2003),  earlier  work  on the relationship. Figure 1 
Interaction between Wife’s Share of Couple Income and Total Couple Income
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Wife's Share in Couple's 0-20 0.67 0.65 0.65
Total Income (%) 20-40 0.84 0.83 0.83
40-60 (ref.) 1.00 1.00 1.00
60-80 1.27 1.30 1.31
80-100 1.40 1.41 1.42
Couple's Total Income, 0-25 1.16 1.12 1.12
Percentile 25-50 (ref.) 1.00 1.00 1.00
50-75 1.02 1.05 1.05
75-100 1.04 1.16 1.16
Couple's Age Difference husband 6 or more years older 1.09 1.05 1.06
husband 3 to 5 years older 0.99 0.97 0.97
husband 1 to 2 years older 0.98 0.97 0.97
age differene <=1 year (ref.) 1.00 1.00
wife 1 to 2 years older 1.26 1.25
wife 3 or more years older 1.62 1.62
Husband's Level of  pre-gymnasium 1.11 1.16
Education gymnasium (ref.) 1.00 1.00
post-gymnasium 0.84 0.81
Wife's Level of  Education pre-gymnasium 1.46 1.42
gymnasium (ref.) 1.00 1.00
post-gymnasium 0.83 0.81
Couple's Relative husband's education higher 0.99
Level of Education same level of education (ref.) 1.00
wife's education higher 0.92
Note:  Relative risks not significantly different from the reference category
at 5% level are in italics.  All other estimates are significant at the 5% level.
Table 3
Relative Divorce Risk by Explanatory Variables estimated from Hazard Regression Models
that also include the control variables presented in Table 1
Guiping Liu and Andres Vikat
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between individual-level economic variables and divorce risk has been based on 
sample surveys 
Throughout the analyses, support was found for the independence effect 
hypothesis, as the divorce risk increased linearly with the share of the wife’s 
income to the couple’s total income. This result is interpreted to be in line with 
the dominant arguments in the literature, according to which a higher income 
lowers the wife’s constraint to exit an unhappy marriage. For women whose 
income is high in both relative and absolute terms, an additional interpretation 
may be that a high absolute income level grants them greater freedom in 
pursuing individual life goals, and that they may place high requirements on the 
qualities of their partner. A couple’s non-traditional income ratio may have a 
negative influence on the quality of the relationship by threatening the 
traditional division of labour and breadwinner roles if these are valued by at 
least one of the spouses, usually the husband. The egalitarian value orientations 
prevailing in Sweden are assumed to reduce the influence of the non-traditional 
income ratio of spouses on their relationship quality. Against this background, 
finding such a strong independence effect and no support to the egalitarian 
gender attitudes hypothesis may be seen as somewhat unexpected. However, 
results of a recent study from Finland, where the context of gender relations 
resembles that of Sweden, were also consistent with the independence effect 
(Jalovaara, 2003). 
The direction of the causal link between relationship quality and relative income 
can also be the opposite one, however. Johnson & Skinner (1986) and Rogers 
(1999) show that increases in perceived marital discord are related to increases 
in wives’ income. If this relationship holds in Sweden, it would explain some of 
the variation in divorce rates by spouses’ relative income that is presented. 
With register data, it would not be possible to disentangle the relative 
importance of those interpretations: a self-supporting wife has a lower threshold 
to exit an unhappy marriage, the unconventional power relations resulting from 
the wife’s higher income decrease the relationship quality, or marital discord 
stimulating wives to increase their income. It is likely that they all contribute to 
shaping the observed divorce pattern by spouses’ income ratio. The age of the 
youngest child is used as a control variable in your models because of its high 
association with divorce risk as indicated in existing literatures. The number of 
children in the family, however, could be a factor that is related to couples’ 
economic status and plays role in influencing family stability. This study would 
be more convincing if this issue is taken into consideration.   
Our study lends some support to the income effect: couples with low income 
had a higher divorce risk. In the higher income brackets, divorce rather 
increased with income. Like previous studies that have aimed at distinguishing 
between the income and the independence effect (Greenstein, 1990, 1995), our Guiping Liu and Andres Vikat 
CSP 2007, 34.2:  217-240  236
finding is inconclusive pointing at the existence of this effect only in a part of 
the income distribution.  
Our hypotheses about equally dependent spouses and egalitarian  gender 
attitudes focused on couples where each partner contributed 40-60% of the 
income. This group hardly deviated from the overall pattern of a linear 
relationship between the wife’s relative income and divorce risk. The hypothesis 
on equally dependent spouses was supported to the extent that it compares this 
group to the couples with traditional income configuration. However, the further 
linear increase of divorce risk among the reverse traditional couples where the 
wife is the main earner of family incomes does not distinguish the group of 
equal earners within the overall linear relationship between the wife’s relative 
income and divorce risk. Correspondingly, the hypothesis on reverse traditional 
couples did not find support either.  
Our study highlights that couples where the wife earns more than the husband 
have a relatively high divorce risk not only in a traditional set up but also in a 
society that is organized on the principles of gender equality and with dominant 
egalitarian gender views. 
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